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Abstract: The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of four major donors of foreign 
aid in the Arab World. Together, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, 
and Qatar have made substantial foreign aid contributions, frequently exceeding 
the United Nations' development assistance target of 0.7% of Gross National 
Income (GNI). These generous Arab donors, however, are notorious for their 
opaque development programs: little is publicly known about their aid activities 
and allocation preferences. With the establishment of its Office for the 
Coordination of Foreign Aid, the UAE has made a more tangible effort to 
increase its transparency than some of its neighbors, but information regarding 
its aid program is still limited. In this thesis, I will provide an overview of the 
UAE's aid activity. I will also examine the UAE's foreign aid program as a 
foreign policy tool, analyzing its adherence to two theoretical justifications for 




 The late 20th and early 21st centuries have coincided with a period of immense 
economic development and widening political influence for the countries of the Arabian 
Gulf. In fact, some scholars even consider the time period in question the “Arab Gulf 
moment in contemporary Arab history” (Abdulla, 2010, 1). Numerous factors distinguish 
the wealthy monarchies of the Arabian Gulf – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, 
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates – from their other, perhaps more widely studied, 
Middle Eastern counterparts. For instance, together, these countries form the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), a political and economic union unique to the Arabian Gulf 
region. These wealthy monarchies have been relatively stable compared to their 
neighbors in the Levant, Iraq, and North Africa. While some domestic upheaval has taken 
place in the Arabian Gulf states, none has come close to the debilitating sectarian 
conflicts that grip Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt today. Indeed, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Bahrain, and Kuwait have endured mild forms of domestic insurrection compared to the 
violence that characterizes everyday life elsewhere in the Arab World.  
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 The region’s political stability can be attributed to a number of different factors, 
among the most important of which is the Arabian Gulf states’ continued economic 
development. Economic growth in the Arabian Gulf states compares very favorably to 
the world average: whereas Gulf economies sustained an average annual growth rate of 
about 5.8% between 2000 and 2010, the global economy only experienced an annual 
growth rate of 4.3% (World Development Indicators, 2013). The United Arab Emirates in 
particular achieved a growth rate of about 6.1%, exceeding the regional average, between 
2005 and 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). The United Arab Emirates has 
achieved a healthy balance of economic and political stability thanks to its early 
investment in human capital and infrastructure (Davidson, 2011). Moreover, a 
combination of copious oil wealth and a purposely small citizenry has allowed the United 
Arab Emirates to provide its people with tremendous fiscal benefits, securing its high 
standard of living and keeping domestic pressures for political reform at bay.  
From a foreign policy perspective, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an 
interesting and understudied case. The Emirates’ foreign policy decisions have not 
generated as much analysis as those of some of its Arab neighbors to the west, considered 
to hold greater historical and cultural significance to the region. Proportionally immense 
oil wealth has increased the Emirates’ influence in the Arab World, however, and has 
allowed this federation of dynastic monarchies to exercise various tools to pursue its 
foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, despite the increased regional significance that 
comes with oil wealth, Secretary of State John Kerry credits Saudi Arabia with being 
“really the sort of senior player, if you will, within the Arab world,” suggesting that the 
UAE may not be an important figure in Arab foreign policy (Hersh, 2013). Even so, the 
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United Arab Emirates has managed to stay out of the sectarian violence that has gripped 
the Levant and Iraq and the rampant political upheaval in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. 
Although the UAE has recently jailed several Emiratis with links to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, it is generally regarded as one of only two states (the other is Qatar) that 
have managed to avoid widespread civil uprising (Al Khoori, 2014). The Emirates’ lack 
of domestic insurrection might suggest that the ruling regime structures its domestic and 
foreign policies to maintain its stability and longevity. I aim to test the validity of this 
claim with respect to Emirati foreign policy.  
Traditionally, the UAE has never been a key player in major instances of Arab 
war and peace. Indeed, as a modestly sized Gulf nation with an equally small citizenry, 
the UAE is not vying for regional leadership in the Arab World, which is the primary 
driver in its sometimes-muted responses to conflicts in other Middle Eastern countries. 
Moreover, the Emirates’ foreign policy decisions cannot be judged purely in the context 
of conventional international relations paradigms, such as neorealism and other systemic 
approaches that treat states as unitary, monolithic actors. Instead, the UAE’s wealthy and 
relatively diversified economy, along with its unique demographic composition, have 
unique influences on Emirati foreign policy behavior, which merit the consideration of 
other theoretical explanations, like Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) selectorate theory, 
Herb’s (1999) arguments with respect to dynastic monarchy, and Telhami’s (1993) public 
opinion theory.  
In this study, I will focus specifically on the United Arab Emirates’ foreign aid 
program and argue that the UAE is more concerned with proliferating soft, rather than 
hard, power. First, it uses foreign aid to support Arab and especially Muslim neighbors, 
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adhering to the presence of regional norms of faithfulness to the Arab and Muslim 
Worlds when making foreign policy decisions. Second, the UAE uses its foreign aid 
program to bolster its international brand: the UAE rewards recipients who help it to 
achieve global recognition as a progressive, modern oasis in the turbulent Arab World, a 
pervasive national goal. Third, Emirati foreign aid also serves to reward recipients’ 
personal connections to members of the ruling families, reflecting the importance of 
decision-makers aside from the head of state, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed.  
After placing Emirati foreign aid in both non-Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC)1 and Arab aid contexts, I will provide an explanation of the key theoretical 
justifications for my arguments. Then, I will conduct an econometric analysis of the 
UAE’s aid allocation patterns based on available quantitative data to see how Telhami’s 
(1993) public opinion theory, and more specifically, transnational symbols of Arab and 
Islamic legitimacy, appear to influence Emirati aid decisions. Finally, I endeavor to 
explain how certain members of the royal families of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the emirates 
from which most Emirati aid comes, impact aid outcomes, sometimes with the goal of 
boosting the UAE’s regional and global reputation. To do so, I rely on the findings of 
several qualitative interviews with scholars and representatives of the Emirati private and 
public sectors. Ultimately, I have two goals: first, to illuminate the aid practices of a 
prominent donor in a relatively understudied part of the world; and second, to judge 
whether or not UAE’s foreign aid program follows the expectations of prominent 
theoretical justifications for Arab foreign policy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) consists of 29 members from Europe, North America, and East Asia. The EU is also a 
full member; the World Bank, IMF, and UNDP are permanent observers. DAC member countries are 
typically viewed as the “world’s leading providers of economic aid” (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2011) 
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II. Emirati aid in a regional and global context 
Of the four major donors of foreign assistance in the Middle East, which include 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, the UAE has made the most 
recent efforts to increase its transparency. While the Saudi Arabia and Kuwait both have 
bilateral aid agencies that publish annual reports, the UAE has recently attempted to 
make information on its donations available to a global audience with the creation of its 
Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid (OCFA) to organize the Emirates’ 
humanitarian efforts (United Arab Emirates Foreign Affairs Ministry, 2013). While the 
UAE’s efforts to increase its transparency distinguish it from its wealthy Arab 
counterparts, it is still understudied and less transparent relative to prominent donors of 
foreign aid in other parts of the world. As a result, the availability of scholarly literature 
on Emirati foreign aid behavior is extremely limited. Given the limited literature on 
Emirati foreign aid behavior, I will review two different, but related bodies of work: 
literature on non-traditional donors and literature specifically on Arab donors.  
i. Non-traditional Donors 
 
 Some of the earliest forms of foreign aid date back to the 18th century, when the 
Kingdom of Prussia subsidized its military allies. By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
Western powers gave grants and loans to governments in their colonial settlements, 
primarily for purposes of economic development. According to several scholars, 
however, modern conceptions of foreign assistance have their origins in the period 
directly following World War II, namely with the institution of the Marshall Plan and the 
creation of the Bretton Woods system, establishing bilateral and multilateral trends in 
foreign assistance respectively (Hjertholm and White, 2000; Kanbur, 2003). In the period 
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following World War II, the primary goal of most foreign assistance was the 
rehabilitation of war-torn Europe, rather than the growth and development of previously 
unindustrialized parts of the world.  
In the decades following the end of the Second World War, the most visible and 
active donors were wealthy Western countries, but late 20th and 21st centuries have 
witnessed a shift in foreign aid trends with the emergence of non-Western donors 
(Woods, 2008). Traditional, established donors of foreign aid have typically been 
associated with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an organization of which the UAE 
is not a part. Non-traditional donors, a group that includes the UAE and other Gulf Arab 
countries, are by contrast most commonly grouped together by their lack of DAC 
membership. Much of the existing literature on non-traditional donors refers to them as 
“new” or “emerging” actors in international development; however, many have engaged 
in donor behavior for several decades, with the People’s Republic of China, one of the 
most prominent emerging donors, giving aid since the late 1940s, and a few Gulf Arab 
countries donating since the mid-1970s (van den Boogaerde, 1991; Villanger, 2007; 
Woods, 2008; Shushan and Marcoux, 2011). Scholars like Chandy (2012) discuss another 
defining characteristic of non-traditional donors: many such providers of foreign aid were 
once recipients of it. This phenomenon, however, cannot be applied universally. Many 
Arab donors, for instance, have engaged in donor activities since independence. This is 
true of the UAE, which became independent from the United Kingdom and established 
itself as a federation of seven emirates in 1971 (Rouis, 2010).  
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Non-traditional donors have been credited with a number of changes in 
development assistance’s allocation and effectiveness, which scholars have treated with a 
mixture of praise and criticism. Although DAC donors generally give more than $100 
billion each year in official development assistance (ODA), scholars agree that non-
traditional donors have been generous, collectively providing between $10 billion and 
$15 billion in aid annually (OECD, 2014). Moreover, non-traditional donor gift levels are 
expected to double in the next five years, while traditional DAC donor levels are 
expected to remain relatively stable, or even to start declining slowly (Manning, 2006; 
Chandy, 2012). The literature on non-traditional donors, however, reveals a few 
widespread critiques, pointing to many challenges they introduce to international 
development, particularly in the realm of aid effectiveness and transparency. One notable 
critique of non-traditional donors comes from Moises Naim (2007), who claims that 
donors like China and Venezuela are “toxic.” He argues that non-traditional donors, 
which are often undemocratic and newly industrialized, undermine traditional 
development policy by providing very generous aid to secure their own political gains 
unrelated to global development and without including requirements that recipients 
follow certain reform-minded rules, such as making sure aid goes to the poorest domestic 
populations and improving the efficiency of economic institutions (2007). He also argues 
that the immense financial might with which many non-traditional donors are equipped is 
“pricing responsible and well-meaning aid organizations out of the market,” highlighting 
another sometimes-cited argument that aid from non-traditional donors is displacing 
traditional, perhaps more effective, Western sources of aid due to its increasing 
prevalence and volume (Naim, 2007). Others, like Chandy (2012), agree with Naim, 
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arguing that non-traditional donors do not place enough emphasis on promoting good 
governance and enforcing requirements for responsible use of donated funds, placing 
undue focus on their own national interests. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has 
even warned recipient countries to be “wary of donors who are more interested in 
extracting your resources than in building your capacity” (Bland and Dyer, 2011).  
Other critiques include the argument that non-traditional donors, due to their own 
undemocratic nature, provide financial support to undemocratic, opaque, and corrupt 
“rogue” states, and that the same donors, like China, are increasing the indebtedness of 
poor countries by “free-riding” on debt relief programs installed by established donors. 
For instance, these non-traditional donors provide new loans to recipients and create fresh 
debts, which are ultimately costly to traditional donors in the form of increased debt relief 
(Schudel, 2008; Reisen, 2007). Indeed, literature on non-traditional donors highlights 
deficiencies in the foreign assistance they provide, but many scholars, like Woods (2008), 
have presented arguments to highlight the exaggerated nature of these criticisms. In her 
influential paper, “Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent 
revolution in development assistance,” Woods provides evidence that problems with 
development assistance are common across all donors, both non-DAC and traditional 
(2008). In response to the argument that non-traditional donors undermine efforts to 
improve governance and decrease corruption, Woods concedes that non-traditional 
donors have not been as engaged as established donors in developing and applying 
development assistance standards. She argues, however, that non-traditional donors, as 
well as private sector actors and other nontraditional donors, have been excluded from the 
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standards discussion, and that more “inclusive” standards promulgation processes should 
be introduced (2008, 1212).  
While critics of non-traditional donors often point to China as the primary culprit 
of various development assistance mistakes and taboos, scholars like Dreher and Fuchs 
(2011) have argued that China is not motivated by the natural resource endowments of its 
recipients. They present empirical evidence rejecting the idea that China places special 
emphasis on commercial ties with and natural resources in the recipient country when 
making aid allocation decisions. Dreher and Fuchs conclude that “the verdict that China’s 
foreign aid is ‘rogue aid’ seems wide of the mark” in a direct response to Moises Naim’s 
2007 argument (2011, 28). Ultimately, the literature on non-traditional donors does not 
come to a singular, universal conclusion on the effectiveness of non-traditional donors. 
There appears to be a general consensus, however, that non-traditional and traditional 
donors have various imperfections that can and should be ameliorated, including a lack of 
conditionality for the former and neglecting the poorest, though generally most politically 
corrupts recipients for the latter.  
ii. Arab Donors 
 
 The body of literature on Arab foreign aid and development assistance is quite 
small: given the notoriously opaque nature of Arab donors, it is unsurprising that 
relatively few articles and books have been written on their preferences and activities. In 
addition to recognition of the dearth of information on the subject, authors specializing in 
the Arab role in international development generally agree that Arab donors have been 
disproportionately generous compared to traditional DAC donors (van den Boogaerde, 
1991; Neumayer, 2004; Villanger, 2007; Shushan and Marcoux, 2011).  
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 Although some early overviews of Arab foreign aid exist (El Mallakh and 
Kadhim, 1976), Pierre van den Boogaerde’s 1991 paper, “Financial Assistance from Arab 
Countries and Arab Regional Institutions” was for many years the most exhaustive and 
expansive evaluation of bilateral and multilateral aid from the Arab World. Van den 
Boogaerde credits the rapid rise in regional oil revenues following the 1973 oil embargo 
as the catalyst for major increases in foreign aid from Arab donors. He also points to 
fluctuations in the oil market as a primary factor in Arab foreign aid’s decline in the 
1980s, but maintains that, as a portion of gross national product (GNP), Arab states were 
still the most generous group of donors in the world during this time (1991). Although 
Shushan and Marcoux (2011) claim that, in the 20 years between van den Boogaerde’s 
(1991) publication and their own, Arab generosity has been declining, they emphasize 
that foreign aid from the region proportionate to GNP still exceeds levels from other 
established donors.  
 Due to the scant availability of public information on Arab foreign aid, much of 
the literature on Arab donors contains an overview of the organizational structure of 
bilateral and multilateral forms of assistance in the region (van den Boogaerde, 1991; 
Neumayer 2003; Neumayer 2004; Villanger, 2007; Shushan and Marcoux, 2011). With 
the exception of Qatar, each of the Arab World’s primary donors has its own national 
agency in charge of its bilateral commitments: Kuwait was the first to establish an agency 
of this type with the creation of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
(KFAED), followed by the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD), and 
finally, Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) (Neumayer, 2004; Shushan 
and Marcoux, 2011). Additionally, there are a number of regional multilateral foreign aid 
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institutions in the Arab World. According to Eric Neumayer (2004), while bilateral 
agencies offer some grants-in-aid, multilateral agencies in the Arab World deal almost 
exclusively in loans and guarantees. One multilateral aid agency, the Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development (AFESD), is particularly important, not only due to 
its exceptionally high cumulative disbursement amounts, but also because it hosts the 
Coordination Secretariat, the chief regional coordinating body for both the Arab World’s 
bilateral and multilateral institutions. Although the Coordination Secretariat was created 
to bring together the major Arab development assistance agencies, and has served as a 
vessel through which certain co-financing projects between Arab and non-Arab donors 
can take place, its function is limited to disseminating statistical information about its 
members’ donation activities (Neumayer, 2004). Nevertheless, the Coordination 
Secretariat does not have its own website and does not publish its statistical information 
in a publicly visible forum, highlighting Arab donors’ lack of transparency and 
illuminating the reasons for the limited body of literature on the subject.  
While much of the existing literature devotes significant effort to describing Arab 
foreign aid and its structure, several authors have also attempted to gauge Arab motives 
for aid allocation (Neumayer, 2003; Neumayer, 2004; Villanger, 2007; Shushan and 
Marcoux, 2011). Pan-Arab growth and development is among the primary motives for 
foreign aid from Arab donors. In the early years of Arab development assistance, 
throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Arab recipients were almost exclusively 
the beneficiaries of Arab foreign aid (van den Boogaerde, 1991; Neumayer 2003; Rouis, 
2010). Indeed, the Arab and Islamic nature of Arab foreign aid is made obvious by the 
names of many aid agencies in the region, such as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). 
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Although its name changed in the mid-1970s, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development used 
to be called the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (Villanger, 2007).  
Neumayer’s study finds statistically significant relationships between Arab aid 
allocations and Arab, Muslim, and Sub-Saharan African recipients (2003, 142). Given the 
importance of the Palestine question in promoting transnational solidarity in the Arab 
World, and hence the expectation that states with diplomatic relations with Israel would 
be less likely to receive Arab foreign aid, Neumayer interestingly finds that recipient 
relations with Israel are not a statistically significant determinant of Arab foreign aid 
allocations (Telhami, 1993; Neumayer, 2003). Today, Neumayer is still one of the only 
authors to have conducted a rigorous statistical analysis of Arab aid allocations. I will 
partially fill this gap by statistically analyzing Emirati aid allocations in the data analysis 
section of this thesis, but specific and extensive quantitative analyses of Kuwaiti, Saudi, 
and Qatari foreign aid remain unexplored in the literature. Moreover, Neumayer 
concludes that Arab donors take a country’s level of income into account when 
considering aid allocations, making the typical recipient a low or low-middle income 
country (2003). While this holds true in many cases, the UAE has made aid commitments 
to wealthy Gulf states like Bahrain and Oman as recently as 2008 (AidData 3.0, 2011). 
Moreover, while other commitments to Gulf countries may have occurred after 2008, 
especially during political uprisings against the Sunni, and thus UAE-friendly leadership 
in Bahrain, available data are either unavailable or insufficient. As a result, the 
importance of Arab or Islamic identity may play a more important role in Emirati aid 
allocations, a hypothesis I will explore in the findings section of this thesis.  
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Ultimately, although existing literature on Arab donors offers a comprehensive 
and detailed overview of chief Arab bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, it may be 
impossible to know the full extent of Arab donor activity. A great deal of Arab foreign 
aid is channeled through the donor country’s ministry of finance, unrecorded and 
unpublicized, and some of it is distributed secretly directly from the royal families 
themselves (Neumayer, 2004; Villanger, 2007; Shushan and Marcoux, 2011). Shushan 
and Marcoux (2011) offer five distinct explanations for Arab donors’ lack of 
transparency: (i) Arab donors are autocratic rentier states whose citizens are placated with 
low levels of taxation, and therefore, do not hold their governments accountable for 
publicizing aid allocations; (ii) Arab donor governments may wish to keep potentially 
unpopular donations private; (iii) Arab donors have not been exposed to the same 
transparency norms as traditional DAC donors; (iv) the unclear distinction between 
public and private funds unique to Arab political economy makes defining official Arab 
development assistance difficult; and (v) Arab cultural norms frown upon publicizing 
financial contributions, which may appear boastful and immodest. Along with the Arab 
World’s apparent lack of transparency is a lack of conditionality in Arab aid allocations. 
Arab donors do not seem as concerned with requiring good governance in recipient 
countries as Western donors, and instead, appear to maintain a standard of non-
interference in recipient government policy politically, economically, and otherwise 
(Villanger, 2007). Although Arab aid differs from Western aid in terms of transparency 
and conditionality, the motivations for both may be similar.  
Like Western aid, Arab aid appears to be strategic in nature: it rewards recipients 
who choose the “correct” military alliances, for example (Villanger, 2007). During the 
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first Gulf War, Arab aid to countries which supported the liberation of Kuwait and the 
US-led coalition against Iraq increased dramatically. Political developments in recipient 
countries appear important to Arab aid allocations as well, regardless of Arab or Muslim 
identity: for instance, Egypt’s aid disbursements from Arab donors dropped significantly 
after Egypt signed the Camp David Accords with Israel (Villanger, 2007). Although 
Neumayer (2003) finds that relations with Israel do not significantly discourage the 
generosity of Arab donors, major transgressions of the Arab position on Palestine are 
likely to receive retribution in terms of foreign aid from the Arab World. Aside from 
Villanger’s 2007 paper, however, there is very little literature devoted to Arab 
motivations for foreign aid. Although many authors detail Arab donors’ overall 
propensity to give and the characteristics of the typical recipient, the reasons for Arab 
foreign aid and how they relate to foreign policy are not explored deeply (van den 
Boogaerde, 1991; Neumayer, 2003; Neumayer, 2004; Shushan and Marcoux, 2011). 
Country-specific analyses are especially absent. I hope to fill both of these gaps in part by 
discussing why the Emirates donate and how foreign aid serves as a tool for achieving its 
foreign policy goals. 
In the next chapter, I will introduce and discuss two different theoretical 
justifications for Emirati foreign policy decisions, public opinion theory and selectorate 
theory, before outlining the expectations of each approach for the UAE’s foreign aid 
program. In the following two chapters, I will use two different approaches to analyze 
how theory applies to the realities of Emirati foreign aid. In Chapter IV, I aim to test the 
validity of Telhami’s (1993) public opinion theory in relation to Emirati foreign aid 
decisions with an econometric analysis of project-level data from the UAE. I have coded 
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Muslim and Arab dummy variables, among others, for each recipient of Emirati foreign 
aid, and will test the relationships between these characteristics and commitment amounts 
to determine if a broad Arab and Muslim identity influences the UAE’s level of 
generosity. In Chapter V, I will assess how well Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) 
selectorate theory applies to Emirati aid. I plan to relay the findings of several qualitative 
interviews conducted in the UAE and will present evidence pointing to the influence of 
specific royal family members and their foreign aid interests.  
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III. Emirati Foreign Aid through the Lenses of IR Theory and Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
 In this chapter, I will argue that transnational Arab and Muslim symbols of 
legitimacy as well as the decision-making power of royal family members aside from the 
ruler best explain Emirati aid decisions. The UAE has never been a driving force in Arab 
foreign policy, but its simultaneously autocratic and consistently stable domestic 
environment are a point of interest. Thus, instead of embarking on a study of Emirati 
foreign policy with systemic, international-level theories of international relations, it may 
be more germane to consider a mix of material and ideational domestic-level approaches. 
I will first analyze how public opinion theory (Telhami, 1993) works to influence the 
UAE’s foreign policy decisions, focusing specifically on the importance of transnational 
symbols of Arab and Muslim solidarity. Then, I will consider selectorate theory (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al., 2003) and how it is complemented by Herb’s (1999) interpretation of 
the distribution of power in a dynastic monarchy like the UAE. Then, I will determine 
what each theoretical justification predicts for the UAE’s foreign aid program. This 
section in particular will serve to elucidate the assumptions of these theoretical 
justifications. 
i. Public Opinion Theory 
 
Public opinion theory, both ideational and domestic-level due to its reliance on 
the ideas and viewpoints of individuals within polities, is the most salient approach to the 
UAE’s foreign policy decisions. According to Shibley Telhami (1993), while scholars of 
governance and international relations often study the impact of public opinion in 
democratic systems of government, they have often overlooked the importance of Arab 
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public opinion due to the existence of so many repressive autocratic regimes in the 
Middle East. He makes the argument, however, that public opinion should be considered 
due to the presence of transnational Arab and Muslim symbols of legitimacy; 
consequently, Arab leaders, including the most autocratic among them, must be 
concerned with overall Arab opinion (1993, 439). While public opinion theory takes 
domestic public opinion into account, Telhami’s interpretation makes the case for 
regional and even international public opinion, the presence of which means electoral 
legitimacy (or a lack thereof) within a polity is not the only factor influencing the 
viewpoints of the public (1993). If Arab public opinion does not favor an Arab leader, 
then he may have reason to fear the negative influence it may have on his own polity and, 
subsequently, the internal stability of his state (Telhami, 1993). In the Arab World, 
different polities are connected through shared language, history, and culture. Indeed, 
many of the borders delineating statehood in the region were artificially drawn in the 
early to mid-20th century, resulting in individual national populations that have existed 
for less than a century. When this short national history is compared to a broad Arab 
ethnic origin that dates back to pre-Islamic times, the idea that a broader Arab or Muslim 
public opinion could influence individual domestic polities seems straightforward. 
Although Barnett (1998) argues that Arabism and the associated idea of an Arab regional 
identity are on the wane as the importance of state sovereignty increases, the 
transnational sectarianism currently gripping the Middle East suggests the importance of 
Islamic symbols to the Arab public: radical Islamism and other religious currents are at 
the forefront of most of the region’s conflicts. Together, the brief lifetime of Arab state 
borders, the numerous shared characteristics among different polities in the region, and 
 19	  
the lack of transparency within many Arab states all motivate domestic populations to 
value opinions in the broader Arab World as a means of judging their own leaderships. 
Ultimately, they also make a strong case for the consideration of a broader Arabo-Islamic 
public opinion and its influence on domestic public opinion within the UAE.  
Although the UAE has managed to placate a citizenry without electoral rights 
with the provision of ample financial benefits, which may mean that domestic public 
opinion is not a source of worry, the presence of aforementioned transnational symbols of 
legitimacy and the added consideration of regional public opinion has affected Emirati 
foreign policy decisions. In order to boost its image among its Arab and Muslim 
neighbors, the UAE has engaged in generous foreign aid donations (Davidson, 2011). 
According to Telhami (1993), transnational symbols of Arab and Islamic legitimacy 
motivate autocratic Arab leaders to consider regional public opinion in their foreign 
policy decision-making, even though domestic public opinion may not be especially 
important to them. Although Telhami concedes that Arab states, like others elsewhere in 
the world, are primarily considered with their own national interests, he argues, “since 
most political movements within each [Arab] state profess broader Arab and Islamic 
objectives, any Arab government must present credentials on those issues” (1993, 439). 
He goes on to mention two particularly important issues linking Arab public opinion and 
foreign policy decision-making: general anti-Western, anti-imperialist sentiments and the 
Palestine question (Telhami, 1993, 441). Indeed, both themes could be at play in Emirati 
foreign aid decisions. According to UAE commitment data, the UAE appears to fill gaps 
left by Western donors: whereas traditional Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
donors typically favor democratic or non-repressive regimes for donation, and include 
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requirements for improved governance and lower levels of corruption when 
implementing projects in recipient states, the UAE has generally concentrated its 
commitments, often without conditionality, to recipients with autocratic governments 
(Villanger, 2007; AidData 3.0, 2013). Although this does not directly reflect an 
anticolonial sentiment from the UAE, it shows its commitment to a group of Arab 
countries, like Yemen, Sudan, and Syria that have sometimes been excluded from 
Western channels of aid due to their rigid authoritarian governments.  
Perhaps more obviously, the UAE’s aid decisions might demonstrate an 
adherence to the transnational symbol of Palestinian solidarity and anti-Israeli sentiment. 
Throughout the Arab World, public perceptions of Israel are obviously negative, but 
Emirati respondents to Zogby’s Arab Values Survey gave Israel a score of 2 out of 912, 
the lowest of any Arab public perception of any state (Furia and Lucas, 2006). One of the 
clearest examples of Emirati foreign aid’s connection to the overall importance of the 
Palestine question pertains to the temporal pattern of its donations to Egypt. According to 
data from AidData 3.0 (2013), the UAE made six commitments to Egypt between 1974 
and 1978, and only three in the period between 1979 and 2010. The most likely reason 
for this sharp decline in commitments is Egypt’s recognition of Israel after signing the 
Camp David Accords in 1978 and the subsequent ratification of the 1979 Egypt-Israel 
Peace Treaty. Income levels do not appear to have motivated this decline; whereas aid 
flows from donor to recipient typically slow down or stop if the recipient experiences 
increases in income and is no-longer considered a low-income country, Egypt has always 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Furia and Lucas (2006) measured the percentage of respondents from a subject country who have “very” 
or “somewhat” favorable opinions of a given object country. They have 91 subject/object “dyads” (i.e. 
Emirati attitudes towards Israel). The worse a subject country’s opinion of the object country, the lower the 
score on a 91-point scale. The UAE’s score of 2 out of 91 with respect to Israel was the lowest of any 
subject/object dyad relationship.  
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been one of the Arab World’s poorer states: until the late-1990s, Egypt’s GDP per capita 
(in constant US dollars) never exceeded $1,000 and was as low as $580 when the Camp 
David Accords were signed (World Development Indicators, 2013). Egypt was roundly 
condemned and boycotted for its recognition of Israel within the Arab World, and the 
UAE’s decision to cut off aid in the years following the Camp David Accords conforms 
to the transnational symbol of Arab solidarity against Israel and Zionism (Aftindilian, 
1993).  
No scholarly studies have examined Arab public opinion and its relationship to 
foreign aid. Furia and Lucas (2006) study the impact of Arab public opinion on various 
hypotheses regarding security and trade relations between Arab and other states, but do 
not have a hypothesis pertaining to foreign aid and allocation decisions. Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) provide statistical evidence for two different sets of foreign aid motivations 
only for DAC donors, and do not consider public opinion’s relationship with allocation 
decisions. Nevertheless, the UAE’s commitment to numerous Arab and Muslim states 
suggests a relationship between foreign aid contributions and the existence of a general 
Arabist, Islamic regional order. As a result, it is germane to consider public opinion 
theory as elucidated by Telhami (1993). In fact, the UAE’s foreign program “is helping 
the country's efforts to project benevolent behavior and friendly intentions when 
exercising its influence in the region” (Mitreski, 2013). In a political landscape where 
legitimacy is derived from transnational norms and public opinion, other Arab polities 
would perceive the UAE as a generous advocator of Arab ideals and prosperity. This 
identity arguably serves to increase the UAE’s popularity within the Arab and greater 
Muslim Worlds, and, if Telhami’s hypothesis holds, positively influences public opinion 
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within the UAE and the country’s internal tranquility. Moreover, I suspect that Muslim 
symbols of legitimacy may play a larger role than Arab symbols of legitimacy in 
motivating foreign aid allocation as a vehicle of foreign policy: the concept of sadaqa 
Islamiyya, or Islamic friendship, dictates that it is the moral duty of prosperous Muslims 
to help less prosperous Muslims in their time of need.  
To demonstrate the influence of transnational symbols of legitimacy, I will 
analyze project-level data from the UAE and how commitment amounts appear to differ 
based on recipient characteristics, such as having a Muslim majority or identifying as an 
Arab state, in Chapter IV. If Arab or anti-Zionist characteristics prove statistically 
significant to how much money a recipient gets, then it may be reasonable to assume that 
transnational symbols of Arab legitimacy influence Emirati aid. If Muslim characteristics 
are statistically significant, then there may be evidence that Islamic symbols are 
important to Arab public opinion and, consequently, motivate Arab foreign policies in 
favor of Muslim religious ideals. Ultimately, the available data will help elucidate 
whether and in what ways Telhami’s (1993) theory holds with respect to Emirati foreign 
aid. 
ii. Selectorate Theory and Dynastic Monarchy 
Selectorate theory is a material, domestic-level approach to international relations. 
It is a material approach because it stipulates that a leader will retain his or her rule by 
providing some mixture of private and public goods to his or her winning coalition, the 
subset of the electorate whose support is sufficient to keep the leadership in power 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The theory also qualifies as a domestic-level approach 
because it emphasizes the winning coalition’s role in ensuring a leader’s preservation. 
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Unlike Waltzian neorealism, selectorate theory assumes that states are not unitary actors 
and factors within a state’s boundaries are critical to explaining political survival. 
Additionally, selectorate theory asserts that the ultimate goal of all leaders is survival: 
they will do whatever they can to stay in power.  
According to selectorate theory, there are two key variables in a leader’s quest to 
retain his or her rule: one is the size of the winning coalition, and the other is the size of 
the selectorate. The members of a winning coalition are drawn from the selectorate, 
which is the group within a society whose qualities are “institutionally required to choose 
the government’s leadership” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, 42). To maintain the 
support of the winning coalition, heads of state must provide it some mixture of public 
and private goods. Since autocracies are often characterized by small winning coalitions 
and large selectorates, their leaders will typically opt to provide their winning coalitions 
with a greater share of private goods, i.e. goods that are enjoyed exclusively, by the small 
group of individuals in the winning coalition, including cash and other fiscal benefits, 
university admissions ignoring merit, and other exclusionary gifts. This provision of 
private goods to a particular segment of the populace, the winning coalition, comes at the 
expense of providing public goods to society at large. The large size of autocratic 
selectorates means that the cost of disloyalty and other forms of defection by members of 
the winning coalition is high: other members of the selectorate can easily replace current 
members of the winning coalition.  
Indeed, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue, “In political systems characterized 
by small winning coalitions and large selectorates—as is common in many… 
autocracies—supporters of the leader are particularly loyal because the risk and cost of 
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exclusion... are high” (2003, 8). They also reason, however, that different forms of 
government have distinctively sized selectorates and winning coalitions (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003). Although an absolute monarch will choose to keep members of 
his winning coalition on his side with the provision of extensive private goods, he must 
also pay more attention to the political desires of its members. Since the selectorate is 
small, the cost of disloyalty or defection may not be high for members of a monarch’s 
winning coalition: the chances current members of the winning coalition will retain their 
status if a new leader comes to power are high. In a monarchy, the leader is chosen from 
among a network of royal family members who make up the selectorate. While the 
winning coalition is restricted to those members of the royal family who choose its 
leader, such as the outgoing monarch and his closest advisors, the selectorate is limited in 
size, and more importantly, cannot be changed unless the current royal family is 
overthrown (Herb, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). As a result, while an autocratic 
leader with a large selectorate can replace his winning coalition with other members of 
the selectorate if the former displeases him, a monarch is not afforded the same luxury 
and must heed the wishes of his winning coalition. To protect his rule, the leader of a 
small winning coalition, small selectorate state will make foreign policy, and specifically 
foreign aid decisions that elicit the approval of his or her winning coalition (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith, 2007).  
Applying the selectorate theory framework to the Emirati case, I argue that the 
United Arab Emirates has a small selectorate and a small winning coalition. Each of the 
UAE’s seven emirates has its own royal family and emir. Collectively, however, they are 
subjects of one ruler, the president of the UAE, who is customarily the ruling sheikh of 
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Abu Dhabi, the largest of the emirates. Like other dynastic ruling families in the Gulf, the 
ruling sheikhs of the UAE enjoy support from their immediate relatives, clans, and tribes, 
with the Emirati “family itself [becoming] an institution that has formed a layer of 
structural legitimacy in its own right” (Davidson, 2005, 104). According to Herb (1999), 
the UAE and other Gulf monarchies have several longstanding characteristics that give 
members of their royal families considerable influence over the decisions of the rulers 
and the resulting policies that are implemented. Although the current ruler of the UAE, 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, is a son of the country’s first post-independence president, 
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, there is traditionally no specific order or principle that 
determines which member of the royal family is next in line to the throne. Moreover, 
within the royal families of the Arabian Gulf, the ruler typically has a handful of relatives 
with enough influence and resources to credibly threaten the former’s reign and longevity 
(Herb, 1999, 22). Before the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula, land was divided 
into “segmentary” states: small, very centralized administrations whose rulers shared 
little power with others. If a ruler had outposts or fiefs near the capital of his tiny empire, 
he typically appointed relatives to govern them. As a result, early forms of current Gulf 
governments gave rulers very indirect leverage over the relatives governing their fiefs. As 
a result, the most prominent menace to a ruler’s power was his own relatives (Herb, 
1999). Although fief-owning relatives were individually less influential than the ruler, 
together they outnumbered him and could overthrow him if they were displeased with his 
rule.  
Michael Herb’s (1999) observations about the influence of close family 
members on rulers correspond well with Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) theory of 
 26	  
winning coalitions in dynastic monarchies and other autocratic forms of government. The 
power of the ruler of the modern UAE power is much more centralized than that of his 
pre-oil ancestors: he makes and informs policy decisions for all seven emirates and is 
generally well respected and even revered. Moreover, Abu Dhabi finances most of the 
country’s economic development, and other Emirati sheikhs have often depended on 
financial aid from the emirate (Heard-Bey, 2005; Davidson, 2008). Even Dubai, the most 
economically developed and structurally modernized of the emirates, has depended on 
Abu Dhabi’s significant financial assistance to repay many of its debts (BBC, 2009). 
Thanks to the dependence of other emirates on the economic largesse of Abu Dhabi, its 
ruler enjoys a relatively consolidated power base. The legacy, however, of segmentary 
statehood and its highly decentralized system of rulers strengthens the influence of the 
UAE’s winning coalition: although the state is more centralized than it was before 
independence in 1971, there is a relatively recent precedent for decentralized rule which 
suggests members of the royal family aside from the ruler are either accustomed to or 
familiar with a degree of decision-making independence members of a winning coalition 
in a more traditionally centralized monarchy may not enjoy. 
The relationship between the size of the winning coalition and selectorate and 
the influence of its members is strong with respect to foreign aid. Since monarchs 
typically have to pay more attention to the political desires of their winning coalition, 
members of a winning coalition with an interest in foreign aid would likely be able to 
influence the monarchy’s foreign aid decisions. In a dynastic monarchy like the UAE, the 
influence of the ruler’s family members deserves even more attention due to a pre-
independence tradition of relatively decentralized rule. Together, Bueno de Mesquita et 
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al. (2003) and Herb (1999) have theories that would predict diverse interests from 
throughout the royal family having a role in shaping a country’s foreign aid policy. As 
members of the winning coalition, certain sheikhs related to the UAE’s leader would be 
able to influence which recipients are chosen, what projects are selected, and how much 
money should be donated. Although no quantitative data are available regarding specific 
decision-makers, evidence from several of my qualitative interviews that gives credence 
to the claim that certain members of the Emirati royal families influence the trajectory of 
Emirati foreign aid. I will analyze these interviews in connection with selectorate theory 
in Chapter V.  
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IV. A quantitative analysis of public opinion and Emirati foreign aid 
In a seminal paper on donor motivations for foreign aid, Alberto Alesina and 
David Dollar (2000) provide an econometric analysis of major patterns in traditional 
channels of development assistance. In their study, they look only at OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, limiting the scope of their analysis to traditional 
Western sources of foreign aid. For this reason, their findings provide a useful contrast to 
non-DAC donors, like the UAE, and create a platform upon which to consider how 
Emirati and non-DAC donor motivations differ from those of traditional donors. Alesina 
and Dollar find that DAC donors tend to fall into two groups in terms of motivation: the 
first, which consists mostly of Scandinavian donors, tends to have “good” motivations, 
considering low levels of income and corruption priorities when choosing who receives 
aid and how much to give; the second, which comprises countries including France and 
Portugal, appears motivated by a perceived need for amending colonial-era ills and 
devotes a great deal of its foreign assistance resources to former colonies (2000). Alesina 
and Dollar also find that certain recipient characteristics are highly correlated with aid 
flows among Western donors: for instance, “being Israel” is associated with more than a 
500% increase in aid allocations compared to countries that are not Israel, reflecting the 
importance of foreign policy in aid decisions (2000, 40). Although Israel is not poor, it is 
strategically important to the United States’ interests in the Middle East, which likely 
motivates the high levels of aid it receives.  
While “being Israel” appears to have a positive and significant effect on receiving 
aid from traditional Western donors, particularly the US, according to Alesina and Dollar 
(2000), we should expect the opposite would be true for Arab foreign aid, according to 
 29	  
Shibley Telhami (1993). Arab polities are united by a shared cultural, linguistic, and 
religious history, and certain issues are important across the region. While the lack of 
electoral legitimacy within an autocratic Arab regime might mean that domestic public 
opinion’s effect on foreign policy decisions is negligible, issues like the Arab-Israeli 
conflict span across polities and constrain individual leaders’ and governments’ foreign 
policy decisions (Telhami, 1993). As a result, the public opinion of foreign Arab polities 
can also influence the public opinion of a domestic polity, and can impact the degree of 
internal stability within a state. In order to maintain a positive reputation in the Arab 
World, Telhami (1993) stipulates that Arab leaders adhere to certain transnational 
symbols of legitimacy that reflect the issues important to the regional Arab polity. The 
two different types of transnational symbols – Arab and Muslim – have distinct 
implications for foreign policy. If the former have a greater influence on Arab public 
opinion, then issues of ethnic and cultural importance should motivate Arab foreign 
policy. If the latter were more important, then the shared Islamic religious identity of the 
Arab World would have the stronger effect on foreign policies. Foreign policy decisions 
favoring other Arab or Muslim countries should help boost Arab public opinion of the 
state making them. Moreover, a leader cannot afford to make foreign policy decisions 
that favor Israel or the West, for instance, because the threat of regional backlash and its 
potential influence on internal stability is high. If Telhami were correct, we would expect 
Arab foreign policy decisions, including foreign aid provision, to reflect an adherence to 
Arab and/or Islamic regional norms.  
I hypothesize that the UAE uses foreign aid to cultivate its image in the region as 
a generous benefactor to other Arab and Muslim states. In doing so, the UAE conforms to 
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transnational symbols of legitimacy, simultaneously preserving its internal stability and 
increasing its reputation and influence on the broader Arab and Muslim Worlds. Of 
course, the UAE’s foreign aid flows and commitment amounts are contingent upon its 
own income; fortunately, the Emirates have been blessed with four decades of relative 
wealth since independence, largely due to oil revenues. I will conduct a multiple 
regression analysis with commitment amount as my dependent variable, and independent 
variables aimed at gauging which recipient characteristics are most important to Emirati 
aid decisions, including dummies for Arab, Muslim, Israel diplomacy, and low-income 
characteristics in recipients, and continuous variables for recipient GDP per capita and 
the price of oil per barrel. The last independent variable is pertinent because Arab aid 
flows appear to be contingent upon oil prices (Rouis, 2010).  
i. Preliminary Findings 
In order to assess if and how well the UAE adheres to the symbolic politics of the 
Arab World, I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze Emirati project-
level aid data. My dependent variable is the natural log3 of the commitment amount, 
which is a continuous variable whose relationship to the independent variables is likely 
somewhat linear. My data are a time series, however, reflecting Emirati commitments 
between 1972 and 2010 from AidData (2013), which means I need to take an extra step 
to ensure I would be able to proceed with OLS analysis. In order to test whether time-
series analysis is necessary, I must determine the stationarity of my dependent variable 
(DV) compared to the primary unit of time, which in this case is the year. If my time 
series is stationary, then my DV’s mean and variance are constant over time. Although a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I have chosen to use natural logarithms for my continuous variables (DV and recipient GDP per capita IV) to 
normalize their distributions. Each case for all three variables is large (6+ digits), so taking their natural logs facilitates 
the interpretation of their coefficients. 
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few different stationarity tests exist, like the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test4, generating a 
scatter plot of the DV against the unit of time is an effective and simple alternative. A 
random scatter indicates stationarity; a linear, bugle-shaped, or other pattern indicates a 
relationship between the DV and the unit of time, which implies non-stationarity and 
signals the need for time series regression. Since the scatter plot for my DV and my year 
variable indicated a random scatter, I was able to proceed with OLS regression analysis. 
Pictured below is the scatter plot I used to determine stationarity. The gap in points 
roughly centered above the 1990s is due to missing data for most of that decade. In the 
future, it is important to have these missing data in order to conduct a more statistically 
conclusive analysis. 
Figure 1: Scatter plot for stationarity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 An Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is a test for the presence of a unit root, which is a relationship between variables 
that evolve through time and can cause problems with certain types of statistical inference in time series models. If a 
unit root is not present, then stationarity is assumed and OLS regression analysis in a time series model is permissible. 
For more information on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, see Econometric Analysis by Greene (1997).  
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I chose a set of independent variables (IVs) intended to reflect both the recipient 
characteristics outlined by Telhami’s public opinion theory and those corresponding to 
pro-poor aid practices that conform to the norms of traditional DAC donors. Specifically, 
I chose Arab and Muslim dummy variables to reflect the characteristics of countries that 
would fit the norms laid out by Telhami’s public opinion theory; additionally, I selected a 
dummy reflecting recipient diplomatic relations with Israel to measure the degree to 
which recipients who do not recognize Israel are rewarded with greater commitment 
amounts. To reflect “good” selection practices (i.e. ones that favor the poorest countries), 
I include a dummy indicating whether the recipient is a low-income country (LIC) based 
on World Bank criteria and a variable for recipient GDP per capita. If the UAE follows 
“good” practices, it will be more likely to donate to poor and officially low-income 
countries in accordance with international norms. I used the natural log for the DV and 
the continuous IV reflecting recipient income to normalize their distributions and 
facilitate their interpretation. All continuous variables (commitment amount, recipient 
GDP per capita, and the price of oil per barrel) are measured in constant 2005 US dollars.  
While most variables have no values missing, one recipient of four commitments 
from the UAE, Somalia, has no GDP per capita data available publicly, and four of the 
UAE’s commitments, two to Morocco, one to Yemen, and one to Oman, give no specific 
commitment amounts. Otherwise, the statistics show that the average recipient is likely to 
be Muslim and Arab (with means of 0.84 and 0.64 respectively), but is unlikely to be an 
LIC or have relations with Israel (with means of 0.19 and 0.13 respectively). 
Additionally, the average recipient is a low-middle income country with a GDP per capita 
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of $2,170.33, but some middle-income recipients may be pulling this statistic up—the 
maximum recipient GDP per capita is $14,992. Additionally, like other Arab donors, the 
UAE appears to make very large commitments compared to Western donors, with an 
average commitment amount of almost $59 million (Shushan and Marcoux, 2011). 
Below is a visualization of descriptive statistics for all variables in the model. While 
recipient GDP per capita and the commitment amount are natural logs in the regression, I 
have presented them without taking the natural log for the sake of descriptive 
interpretation. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Muslim 247 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Arab 247 0.64 0.48 0 1 
LIC 247 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Relations w/Israel 247 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Price of oil per barrel 247 40.05 17.70 13.02 85.30 
recipient GDP per capita 243 2170.33 3160.56 186.00 14992.00 
commitment amount 243 58,900,000.00 82,600,000.00 40,330.92 643,000,000.00 
 
Using the tabulate command in STATA, descriptive statistics of the data bolster 
my hypothesis: from 247 commitments, the UAE made 207 to Muslim recipients and 158 
to Arab recipients, while only making 32 commitments to recipients who recognize 
Israel. Nevertheless, while the model does not appear to have problems with linearity or 
omitted variables5, the most insignificant variable came as a surprise. The regression 
results showed a p-value of 0.63 (displayed in Table 3) for the Arab dummy variable, 
which goes against the hypothesis that regional symbols of Arab solidarity motivate aid 
allocations. Nevertheless, the Arab dummy does not appear to be irrelevant: when 
omitted from the regression, it has a moderate impact on the coefficient for the LIC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Functional form and residuals matrices do not show any systematic relationships between variables, and Ramsey 
RESET test for omitted variable bias shows a very statistically insignificant p-value of 0.98  
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dummy variable and a considerable impact on its p-value, which go from -0.46 and 0.15 
to -0.53 and 0.05 respectively. This is perhaps explained by the fact no Arab countries 
qualify as LICs; in fact, most classify as low-middle income countries, and some among 
the UAE’s recipients (chiefly Bahrain and Oman) are middle-income countries. As a 
result, the Arab dummy variable cannot be left out of the model. The final regression 
model6 is as follows, with variables clustered for year due to the presence of multiple 
commitments in each commitment year:  
 
Figure 2: The final model for all projects 1972-2010 
 
 
Additionally, this correlation matrix demonstrates the strength and direction of the 
relationship between the DV and IVs: 
Table 2: Correlation of Commitment Amount and IVs 
 Arab Muslim LIC Recip. GDPpc Price of oil Relations w/ Israel 
Commitment amount 0.20 0.27 -0.16 -0.05 -0.16 -0.09 
Arab  0.58 -0.53 0.21 -0.04 -0.28 
Muslim   -0.32 0.04 -0.09 -0.38 
LIC    -0.50 0.14 0.17 
Recip. GDP per capita     -0.07 0.13 
Price of oil      0.02 
 
The correlation matrix confirms obvious relationships: Arab and Muslim countries, 
which share significant overlap, have a correlation coefficient of 0.58, and Muslim 
countries have a -0.38 correlation coefficient with the Israel diplomacy variable, since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The spelling of “Muslim” is changed in the model representation due to a formatting glitch in Microsoft Equation 
Builder 
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many Muslim countries do not recognize Israel. In line with the hypothesis that the UAE 
favors Arab and Muslim recipients, the DV (commitment amount) has the strongest, 
albeit still modest, relationships with the Arab and Muslim dummies. Moreover, a very 
weak, but still negative relationship exists between the DV and the Israel diplomacy 
variable. While the relationship between the DV and the variables for “good aid 
practices” (the LIC dummy and the continuous recipient GDP per capita variable) are 
weak, the correlation coefficients are nonetheless negative. The correlation coefficient for 
recipient GDP per capita suggests that the UAE is more likely to donate to poorer 
countries, but the stronger negative correlation coefficient for LICs means the UAE is 
even less likely to donate to UN-recognized low-income countries. These conflicting 
conclusions may suggest that the UAE could do more to promote a pro-poor aid policy. 
The most counterintuitive relationship, however, is between the commitment amount and 
the price of oil per barrel, which is negative and not negligible with a correlation 
coefficient of -0.16. Reasons for this negative relationship will be explored with the 
regression results.  
 The final regression results are mixed. Although collectively, the independent 
variables have an F-statistic of 4.16 and corresponding p-value of less than 0.01, meaning 
there is reason to believe that, together, they explain some of the variation in the 
dependent variable, the model displays both intuitive and perhaps counterintuitive 
relationships between the DV and IVs. Nevertheless, the results should be interpreted 
with some important caveats in mind. Firstly, the data are suspect in nature, with many 
years and commitments likely missing, and secondly, the model’s errors may not be 
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normally distributed, which would render me unable to determine the exact distribution 
of my errors or to conduct hypothesis tests to determine significance.7  
Table 3: OLS Estimation, DV: natural log of commitment amount 1972-2010 
N=239 F(6, 28)=4.16 Prob>F=0.01 R2=0.11 Root MSE=1.39 
ln(commitment amount) Coefficients Std. Errors t P>|t| 
Arab 0.14 0.29 0.48 0.63 
Muslim 0.84 0.29 2.90 0.01*** 
LIC -0.46 0.32 -1.47 0.15 
ln(recipient GDP per capita) -0.20 0.11 -1.70 0.10* 
Price of oil per barrel -0.01 0.01 -2.08 0.05** 
Relations w/ Israel 0.23 0.22 1.06 0.30 
Constant 18.13 0.88 20.51 0.00*** 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Despite questions about the normality of the model’s errors, the regression results suggest 
a few things. The only variables significant at the 5% significance level are the Muslim 
dummy and the price of oil per barrel. The relationship between the DV and the Muslim 
dummy supports the hypothesis: being coded as a Muslim recipient is associated with an 
84% increase in the commitment amount, suggesting that the UAE gives significantly 
more to other Muslim recipients and values the transnational symbol of Islamic 
solidarity.  
The relationship between the DV and price of oil per barrel is, however, 
counterintuitive: a one-dollar decrease in the price of oil corresponds to a 1% increase in 
the commitment amount. I included the price of oil as an independent variable to test how 
oil price changes affect commitment amounts, hypothesizing that the two would be 
directly related: with increases in the price of oil (and hence oil revenues) leading to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Errors appear to be homoskedastic, with the residuals-versus-fitted values plot showing a random scatter and results 
of the Breusch-Pagan test showing a p-value of 0.34. With no very strong correlations among IVs and a VIF result of 
1.52, multicollinearity does not appear to be an issue. The skewness-kurtosis test for normality, however, gives a p-
value of 0.000, leading me to reject the null that my errors are normally distributed. Nevertheless, the “qnorm” plot 
makes known the presence of a few strong outliers, which may be biasing the results of the skewness-kurtosis test. 
Rectifying this issue would require additional data and perhaps the omission of unusual observations. 
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increases in commitment amounts. How can we explain this counterintuitive 
relationship? Recipient need provides a possible answer. Many countries that receive aid 
from the UAE are dependent on remittances from the oil market. Given that many Arabs 
and Muslims who do not hail from oil-producing states instead depend on jobs from 
them, when the oil market is hit with a shock, these employees lose wages, which in turn 
depresses remittances that help recipient economies (Gause, 2003). Increasing foreign aid 
when oil prices drop may be a response to increased need on the part of recipient states 
that are suffering the loss of remittances their citizens laboring overseas. 
 Finally, the regression results appear to highlight mixed qualities in the UAE’s aid 
program. While one would expect a “good” donor’s commitment amounts to have a 
positive relationship with a recipient’s LIC status, the coefficient of -0.46 suggests that 
LIC recipients receive 46% less in commitment amounts from the UAE than non-LIC 
recipients. The LIC variable’s p-value, however, is not significant at the 10% significance 
level, which weakens the probability of its relationship with the DV actually occurring. 
Nevertheless, the UAE’s commitment amounts appear to increase as recipient GDP per 
capita decreases: with a coefficient of -0.2, a 1% decrease in recipient GDP per capita 
corresponds to a 20% increase in the commitment amount from the UAE. Given a p-
value of 0.10, the significance of this relationship is more or less acceptable, but p-value 
of 0.05 or less would give the relationship considerably more authority in scholarly 
circles. Ultimately, recipient need does not appear to play as much of a role in Emirati 
giving as other demographic factors, like Islamic identity.   
 When I analyzed Emirati aid at the project level to explore the presence of 
transnational symbols of legitimacy, the only available data was from 1972, when records 
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of Emirati aid were first kept, until 2010. Recently, however, AidData 3.0 (2013) recently 
released 499 observations for 2011. In order to gauge the effect of the new data on my 
hypothesis, I pooled it with the earlier data and created interaction terms8 to see what 
changed. I created a dummy variable for the year 2011 and multiplied it by all the 
variables in my initial model, except the variable for the price of oil variable, which is 
unchanged in interaction with the 2011 dummy since it is invariant by year according to 
available data. When the project year is not 2011, the interaction terms equal zero and the 
model is identical to the original. As a result, when the project year is 2011, I am able to 
interpret the coefficients of the interaction variables, if statistically significant, as changes 
in the donation behavior of the UAE. The process of generating interaction terms resulted 
in the following model and regression output, where X is a vector representing all dummy 
variables (for Arab, Muslim, low-income, and Israel diplomacy characteristics), their 
interactions with the 2011 dummy, and the price of oil: 












 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 An interaction term is a variable that measures a particular independent variable’s effect on the dependent 




Table 4: OLS Estimation, DV: natural log of the commitment amount, 1972-2011 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
The regression output for the model suggests that, for the most part, the UAE’s donating 
behavior did not change significantly in 2011. The coefficients on all the original, non-
interaction independent variables remain the same. Statistically insignificant p-values for 
Arab, Muslim, low-income, and Israel diplomacy dummy variables suggest that the UAE 
remained just as likely to donate to Muslim countries. Moreover, the interpretation that 
the UAE does not appear to favor low-income countries or the absence of diplomatic 
relations with Israel still holds.  One interesting change, however, is worth noting: a 
statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term for recipient GDP per capita 
suggests that the UAE gave more aid to wealthier countries with the 2011 data included. 
The magnitude of the change is interpreted by adding the two coefficients for recipient 
GDP per capita (the original and the interaction term). The sum of the two interactions is 
0.11, which means for every 1% increase in a recipient’s GDP per capita, it received 11% 
more in aid from the UAE. Although the reason for the increase in this coefficient is not 
explicit, it may have resulted in part from the increase of Emirati donations to Latin 
N=746 F(12, 733)=150.3 Prob>F=0.00 R2=0.71 Root MSE=1.94 
ln(commitment amount) Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
2011 dummy -7.85 1.40 -5.59 0.00*** 
Arab 0.14 0.36 0.39 0.70 
Arab*2011 -0.61 0.43 -1.40 0.16 
Muslim 0.84 0.43 1.95 0.05** 
Muslim*2011 0.65 0.51 1.27 0.21 
LIC -0.46 0.45 -1.03 0.30 
LIC*2011 0.44 0.48 0.93 0.35 
Relations w/Israel 0.23 0.41 0.57 0.57 
Relations w/ Israel*2011 -0.69 0.49 1.39 0.16 
Price of oil per barrel -0.01 0.01 1.46 0.14 
ln(recipient GDP per capita) -0.20 0.15 -1.34 0.18 
ln(recipient GDP per capita)*2011 0.31 0.18 1.76 0.08* 
constant 18.13 1.18 15.37 0.00*** 
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American countries, which on average have a higher GDP per capita than most Middle 
Eastern and African countries, in 2011: compared with no commitments in the 1972 to 
2010 period, the UAE made almost 20 commitments to Latin American countries in 2011 
(AidData 3.0, 2014). With a statistical significance of 0.08, however, this relationship 
does not meet the threshold of p=0.05; as a result, this relationship should be regarded 
with some skepticism.  
Ultimately, the credibility of my first hypothesis is mixed. The UAE appears to 
favor Muslim countries, but not necessarily Arab countries, when making commitments. 
Moreover, the weakness and statistical insignificance of the Israeli diplomacy variable 
throws in question the UAE’s adherence to the transnational Arab symbol of anti-
Zionism. Together, one of Telhami’s symbols affecting Arab public opinion – a sense of 
transnational Arab solidarity, which manifests in part with the fight against Israel and for 
Palestine – does not appear to factor into Emirati foreign aid decision-making. The fact 
that the Muslim variable is so strong and statistically significant, however, supports the 
hypothesis, and suggests that the UAE may be making an effort to increase its reputation 
in the Muslim World, a much more far-reaching and globally expansive group of 
countries than the Arab World. The fact that the Muslim variable is so strong may 
suggest that Islam and religious unity is more important to Arab public opinion than 
ethnic or cultural ties that characterize Arab symbols of legitimacy. Indeed, the 
importance of the Muslim symbol of legitimacy is not surprising when considering the 
failure of Pan-Arabism, which relied upon a shared cultural history as a unifying factor 
for the Arab World, and subsequent rise of political Islam as an influential ideology 
(Ajami, 1979; Fayoum, 2011). Nevertheless, the presence of unusual cases may be 
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influencing the data in other ways. Although it is possible that donation amounts could be 
under or misreported, the most notable outliers are a few uncharacteristically low 
commitments to Arab countries,9 which may be affecting the strength and statistical 
significance of the relationship between the Arab dummy and the DV. In further 
iterations of this model and analyses of this data, it would be useful to omit these unusual 
cases and see how the results change. 
 The UAE also appears to have a mixed conformity to “good” donor policies. 
While the data suggest that the UAE seemed to give more money to poorer recipients 
before 2011, its adherence to pro-poor policy is murkier in 2011. Additionally, the UAE 
does not appear to prioritize donations to LICs. The importance of Islamic identity 
suggests that recipient need is not the top priority for Emirati aid allocations, but recent 
efforts to increase transparency with the establishment of the Office for the Coordination 
of Foreign Aid (OCFA) and streamline aid allocation operations with the creation of the 
Ministry for International Cooperation and Development (MICAD) may suggest the 
UAE’s increasing adherence to international donor norms. If this is the case, it may be 
interesting to look at Emirati foreign aid allocations again in a few years’ time to see if 
recipient need increases as a priority. Since pro-poor aid allocation is an important norm 
in international development, the UAE may increase its allocation to poorer countries and 
LICs. 
Before moving on, it is important to remind the reader that the data used in this 
section is missing many observations for the 1990s. The patchy and incomplete nature of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 With almost all UAE commitments exceeding $1 million and frequently reaching amounts in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars, Observation 3 (Bahrain - $322,647), observation 15 (Yemen – $40,331), observation 166 (Syria – 
$266,214), and observation 247 (Yemen - $) are not only obvious outliers, but they affect the leverage of the model and 
are particularly strong on the recipient GDP per capita independent variables, suggesting these observations have an 
amplified or disproportionate influence on the model. 
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the data is not surprising: Arab donors exist in an information-poor part of the world and 
are notorious for their opaqueness. In my travels to the UAE this winter, I was able to fill 
some of the gaps in my data with qualitative interviews that give authority to the idea that 
the Emirates’ reputation in the Muslim world is a top priority, and that certain members 
of the Abu Dhabi and Dubai royal families are critical to foreign aid decisions, a concept 
that I will analyze in depth in the next chapter. 
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V. Vacation homes and falcon hunting: how the royal families influence foreign aid 
In a recent interview, Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a member of the political science 
faculty at the United Arab Emirates University, revealed to me the somewhat haphazard 
nature of Emirati foreign aid decision-making (Abdulla, 2013). He reports that many of 
the UAE’s development assistance commitments are based solely on recipient requests. 
Whereas Western donors like the United States have many specific criteria recipients 
must meet before receiving aid, with some agencies like the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation using scorecards for levels of corruption and economic freedoms to dictate 
who should receive aid, the UAE lacks a highly institutionalized selection process 
(McQueen, 2013). Countries seeking aid can approach the UAE and its wealthy Gulf 
counterparts with specific projects, and will often receive some form of assistance from 
one or more of these generous Arab donors (Abdulla, 2013). When the UAE receives 
such requests, certain members of the royal family have a stake in who is chosen, how 
much money they will receive, and what exact development projects disbursed funds will 
pay for. Countries with certain characteristics, namely those with which prominent 
members of the Emirati royal families closely identify, are more likely to be chosen for 
projects.  
The theories of Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) and Herb (1999) work together to 
suggest that the ruler of an absolute yet formerly segmentary Gulf monarchy like the 
UAE must yield some decision-making power to influential family members on issues in 
which the latter are invested. Since selectorate theory functions under the assumption that 
the primary goal for all leaders is survival, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) would argue 
that a monarch seeking to retain his rule has to allow members of the winning coalition to 
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pursue and influence policies that fulfill their desires, political and otherwise. As a result, 
although Skeikh Khalifa bin Zayed is the UAE’s president and most powerful statesman, 
he must yield to the expertise and preferences of relatives with a clear investment in the 
country’s foreign aid program. These relatives, who are appointed to top positions in the 
UAE’s international development sector, have a key role in selecting recipients and 
implementing foreign aid objectives. Specifically, the influence of relatives like Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Zayed, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Sheikha Lubna Al-Qasimi, 
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed, and others has had a notable 
impact on which recipients receive Emirati aid. Together, they are simultaneously 
members of the royal families and leaders within the country’s bureaucracy, signaling 
their importance to policy decisions and the critical space they occupy within the ruler’s 
winning coalition.  
According to Kofi Rashid, an advisor to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and 
formerly one of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid’s private sector economic consultants, 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed has been the most prominent member in the Emirati 
foreign aid decision-making process, superseding Sheikh Khalifa in many aid-related 
activities (Rashid, 2014). As the UAE’s crown prince, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed 
ensures that the vast majority of Emirati aid policies are made in and implemented from 
Abu Dhabi. While Dubai’s Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid also plays a key role in the 
country’s aid program and numerous charities and non-profit organizations are based in 
the other five emirates, they have a less prominent role than Abu Dhabi in dictating 
foreign aid allocations (United Arab Emirates Foreign Aid, 2013; Rashid, 2014). The 
minister of foreign affairs, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, and the minister of international 
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cooperation and development, Sheikha Lubna al-Qasimi, also contribute significantly to 
the aid implementation process. Finally, other royal family members like Her Excellency 
Reem al-Hashimi, director of the UAE’s Bureau of Statistics, influence the UAE’s 
policies towards developing countries through state-sponsored charitable organizations 
like Dubai Cares, whose sectoral focus is primary education (Rashid, 2014; UAE 
Cabinet, 2014).  
While there are many different royal family members who partake in the UAE’s 
foreign aid decision-making process, their reasons for doing so are often not explicit in 
nature. After my initial interview with Dr. Abdulla, my subsequent interviewees 
confirmed the haphazardness of Emirati aid decisions (McQueen, 2013; Kahwaji, 2013; 
Rashid, 2014). It would be erroneous to say, however, that there is no strategy to Emirati 
aid allocations. While there is no “typical quid pro co” for UAE foreign aid, invested 
sheikhs and sheikhas will select recipients with an Islamic background, highlighting the 
importance of “brotherly relations,” referred to as sadaqa Islamiyya (Islamic friendship) 
in Arabic, with the Muslim world to UAE foreign aid allocations (Rashid, 2014). 
Although the UAE selects many low/low-middle income recipients, the most typical 
characteristic of an Emirati aid recipient is a majority Muslim population. The matrix 
below shows the exact percentages of Muslim and non-Muslim recipients of Emirati aid 
based on data aggregated over time from 1972 to 2011:  
Table 5: Tabulation of Muslim vs. non-Muslim aid recipients 
Recipient Country’s 
Religious Majority Frequency Percent  
Non-Muslim 220 29.33  
Muslim 530 70.67  
Total 750 100  
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The importance of an Islamic identity, while signaling the presence of a transnational 
symbol of Muslim legitimacy consistent with Telhami’s public opinion theory (1993) 
described in the previous chapter, also underlines a preference within the winning 
coalition for Muslim recipients, which may represent a desire for Muslim allies or 
perhaps a less strategic wish to improve the livelihoods of peoples sharing a common 
religion and cultural customs or traditions. The favorability of the selection process 
towards Muslim recipients serves to combine the two theoretical justifications for Emirati 
foreign aid decisions used in this paper.  
While a large majority of aid decisions favor Muslim recipients, the personal 
connections of influential sheikhs determine many of the foreign aid recipients. For 
instance, several recipients of Emirati foreign aid are neither Muslim nor low-income 
countries. Although these recipients may be flagged as outliers, there are reasons, albeit 
less predictable and formalized justifications, for their selection. For instance, the UAE 
has made at least thirteen commitments to the Seychelles in the last 42 years (AidData 
3.0, 2014). The Seychelles is a majority Christian island nation with a GDP per capita of 
14,050 constant 2005 US dollars making it one of the UAE’s wealthiest recipients10. 
Although, upon first inspection, the Seychelles seems like an unlikely recipient of foreign 
aid, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed owns a vacation home on one of the Seychellois islands 
and promotes Emirati development assistance there (McQueen, 2013). According to 
experts working on Emirati aid, a large portion of the UAE’s aid commitments are based 
on particular sheikhs’ personal connections and private conversations with members of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The recipient with the highest GDP per capita in the UAE’s donor history is Bahrain, which had a GDP 
per capita of 14,992 constant 2005 US dollars when it was a recipient of Emirati aid in 2000 
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the leadership in potential recipient countries, which helps elucidate the seemingly 
“random” nature of Emirati development assistance (McQueen, 2013).  
The importance of personal connections to Emirati aid helps explain more than 
just the presence of unusual recipients. Pakistan receives more Emirati aid than any other 
country, and while it is a Muslim country with a host of development-related issues, 
Islamic identity is not the only reason why it is the most likely country to receive foreign 
assistance from the UAE (Rashid, 2014). Indeed, the informal connections of important 
sheikhs appear to influence Pakistan’s desirability as a recipient of Emirati aid. Many 
sheikhs from the Emirates, like Mohammed bin Zayed, travel to Pakistan every year for 
falcon hunting (Abdulla, 2013). Most Pakistani falcon hunting takes place in the north of 
the country, which is also home to some of its most rural, rugged, and underdeveloped 
terrain and communities (Crossette, 1990). According to Dr. Abdulla, the Emirati sheikhs 
who hunt falcons in northern Pakistan witness the dire state of local living conditions in 
the region and want to help improve the fortunes of Pakistanis living in the area (Abdulla, 
2013). Indeed, many Emirati commitments in Pakistan are geographically concentrated in 
Khan Khwar, the Swat Valley, and Punjab province, all in northern Pakistan. Moreover, 
these projects typically target improving access to electric power, the construction of 
roads, and water purification, highlighting a focus on economic development at a basic 
infrastructural level (AidData 3.0, 2014). Falcon hunting sites and the typical locations 
for Emirati aid disbursements in Pakistan, as a result, are highly correlated (Abdulla 
2013). Although evidence of such personal affiliations is anecdotal, it nevertheless 
provides a context for the analysis and reasoning behind some of the most prominent 
Emirati aid decisions. Moreover, as a question for further research, it would be interesting 
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to see what parts Pakistan typically receive foreign aid from other donors, both DAC and 
non-DAC. If these donors generally differ from the UAE in the geographic locations they 
preference, then falcon hunting in Pakistan and other personal affiliations more generally 
may be of even greater importance to Emirati aid decisions.  
Although Emirati aid decisions may seem indiscriminate in many cases, some of 
the experts I interviewed believe the UAE is becoming more strategic with respect to its 
development assistance program (Rashid, 2014). According to all of the scholars and aid 
specialists I interviewed, the Emirati winning coalition has become more realistic in 
recent years, slowly shifting away from an exceptionally idealistic era under Sheikh 
Zayed. While Sheikh Zayed, who is best remembered by his family and citizenry as the 
benevolent father of the modern UAE, was in power, Emirati aid went overwhelmingly to 
other Arab and Muslim nations: the notion of sadaqa Islamiyya was even more 
significant in choosing aid recipients than it is today. Moreover, scholars and experts 
generally view Emirati aid under Sheikh Zayed as a manifestation of a compassionate 
and religious desire to compensate for the UAE’s immense domestic wealth and 
development (McQueen, 2013; Rashid, 2014). Since Sheikh Zayed’s death, however, 
there has been a “realist push” in aid policy, as influential royal family members gain 
more interest in foreign aid (Abdulla, 2013). Sheikhs Mohammed bin Zayed and 
Mohammed bin Rashid, for instance, are said to have an interest in spending Emirati 
money more “wisely” on aid projects with a view to gleaning tangible political and 
economic benefits, such as support for high-publicity and revenue-raising events like the 
Dubai Expo, for the UAE (Rashid, 2014).  
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One example of a potential aid-related benefit once again returns to Pakistan as a 
recipient and relates specifically to Dubai’s bid in the 2020 World Expo, for which it was 
selected as host in mid-2013 (Gulf Business, 2013). By 2020, Dubai will have constructed 
enough hotels to house at least 80,000 rooms and numerous other commercial 
establishments in anticipation of hosting over 25 million tourists for the event (Fitch, 
2014). The Expo will undoubtedly bring in significant tourism-related income and other 
business to boost the UAE’s already steady economy, and is thus considered a 
momentous opportunity by government representatives, citizens, and residents of the 
country. The voting process, however, was closely contested and could have resulted in a 
win by the competing city of Izmir, Turkey (Gulf Business, 2013). As a result, the UAE 
was counting on votes from some important allies; when news broke that Pakistan did not 
vote for the UAE in the Expo, the government was said to be “stunned and disappointed” 
(Gulf News, 2013). To highlight their reasons for disappointment, government 
representatives pointed directly to their generous development assistance programs in 
Pakistan: according to a Gulf News editorial (2013), the government was “disappointed 
because [it] considers [Pakistan] to be [a] close [friend] in whom the UAE has invested 
so much politically and economically. The UAE is a key financial supporter of the 
infrastructure and development projects in Pakistan”. The fact that Pakistan could have 
jeopardized the UAE’s ability to host the Expo appears to have created friction in the 
relations between the two countries. Although there is no available data for how the Expo 
votes may have affected foreign aid, some analysts believe it could lead to a temporary 
decline in future Emirati commitments to Pakistan (Rashid, 2014).  
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The UAE may be using foreign aid to advance its global reputation; indeed, the 
government of the UAE lauded Dubai’s selection as the Expo 2020 host as an 
opportunity to improve its image as “cosmopolitan, open-minded, sophisticated and 
innovative,” which bolsters its status as an attractive location for Western business and 
investment (Gulf News, 2013). This could represent a shift towards a more strategic aid 
decision-making process in support of a concerted effort to build Emirati prestige abroad. 
However, my interviewees gave the impression that Emirati aid will always be more 
favorable towards Muslim recipients than any others, and the benevolent desire to 
improve the livelihoods of the Islamic community will continue to be a top priority 
(Rashid, 2014). Furthermore, although there appears to be a slightly more strategic 
element to Emirati aid allocations, their aid strategy remains “quite altruistic, and 
surprisingly so”: according to Dane McQueen, an advisor to the UAE Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Emirati aid aims to give the most leeway possible to its recipients when crafting 
development policies (2013). For instance, it is not tied and does not incorporate the same 
“reporting burden” and monitoring processes that typically characterize Western aid 
(McQueen, 2013). While this hands-off approach may translate to problems with respect 
to aid effectiveness (i.e. how exactly disbursed funds are spent and how well they achieve 
targets for economic and human development), it indicates that the UAE is willing to 
donate to a number of countries that are typically neglected by Western donors. For 
instance, the UAE donates to several autocratic, but nevertheless relatively poor 
countries, like Iraq and Yemen, which are sometimes barred from more traditional 
Western and multilateral sources of aid due to their political and economic practices.  
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Essentially, the power to make Emirati aid decisions lies with a small group of 
people who rely on various techniques for choosing recipients (McQueen, 2013). 
According to selectorate theory, the winning coalition in a monarchy is difficult to 
replace since the selectorate is so small, and is thus relatively more influential than it 
might be in a small winning coalition/large selectorate system of government, as in a 
dictatorship where sham elections take place (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). As such, 
it is in the best interest of the survival-seeking monarch to allow members of his winning 
coalition to influence policy. This is especially true of a dynastic monarchy like the UAE, 
where the tradition of the segmentary state has translated not only to an inherently 
decentralized loose federation of seven emirates but also to a legacy of relatively 
autonomous decision-makers in the royal families (Herb, 1999). The members of the 
Emirati winning coalition are arguably more accustomed to a high degree of influence 
over the policy generation process than members of a winning coalition where the history 
of the segmentary state does not exist. As evidenced by the interviews I conducted with 
scholars and experts on UAE foreign aid, there are several key members of the Emirati 
royal families who have a clear investment in the country’s foreign aid program. Their 
level of influence is not surprising given the trade-offs that must take place between the 
winning coalition and the leadership as theorized by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).  
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VI. Conclusion: Is aid policy consistent with broader foreign policy? 
 Together, adaptations of public opinion theory and selectorate theory help explain 
significant trends and outliers in Emirati foreign aid commitments. Thanks to the 
importance of sadaqa Islamiyya, the typical recipient of Emirati foreign aid is a Muslim 
country, but recipients who do not fit this profile often receive aid from the Emirates due 
to the informal and personal connections of key sheikhs. Specifically, public opinion 
theory (Telhami, 1993) helps justify why so many recipients of Emirati foreign aid are 
Muslim, and why commitment amounts pledged to Muslim countries are so much higher 
than those to non-Muslim recipients. Selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), 
conversely, provides a logical explanation for which members of the Emirati royal 
families have influence and responsibility over the country’s foreign aid program. In 
particular, selectorate theory rationalizes the varied sources of Emirati foreign aid 
decisions; why the leader appears to occupy a relatively easygoing position with respect 
to his country’s foreign aid program, allowing other members of the royal family to make 
key decisions; and why some Emirati aid recipients do not fit into the predictions set 
forth by Telhami’s theory of transnational symbols of legitimacy.  
 Emirati aid allocation behavior also leads to some interesting conclusions about 
broader Emirati foreign policy and encourages the consideration of other relevant 
hypotheses. With respect to foreign policies relating to security issues, the UAE generally 
follows regional norms, typically set by Saudi Arabia (Ehteshami et al., 1991). Relatively 
small in size and citizenry, the UAE is unlikely to pursue regional leadership; submitting 
to broader Gulf Arab foreign policy trends instead helps the UAE ensure its security and 
the stability of its relations with its immediate, and in the case of Saudi Arabia, much 
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more influential, neighbors (Kechichian, 1985). The UAE’s foreign aid decisions may 
indeed reinforce broader Emirati foreign policy’s deferent character: in its commitment to 
sadaqa Islamiyya and the economic betterment of other Muslim countries, the UAE 
appears to be following a regional norm for foreign aid. The existence of major 
multilateral institutions dedicated to the advancement of the Muslim World, such as the 
Islamic Development Bank, which is headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which is based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, highlights 
both the centrality of Saudi Arabia to Gulf development policies and inter-Islamic 
relations as well as the importance of a shared Islamic identity among Muslim countries 
and the efforts required to secure their welfare and progress. In the absence of similar 
case studies to this one on Saudi, Kuwaiti, or Qatari foreign aid patterns, however, it is 
difficult to convincingly argue the importance of Islamic identity to broader Gulf Arab 
foreign aid and foreign policy.  
Although this case study offers important insights, a few important hindrances 
exist to the quality of analysis and inference that can be made regarding the Emirates’ 
foreign aid program. One of the most significant issues I encountered was the poor 
quality of available data on Emirati foreign aid. First, data are missing for many years, 
with almost all of the 1990s excluded from published aid data. The reasons for this 
exclusion are unclear, and could relate to the history of poor record keeping by donor 
agencies. Although the new Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid (OCFA) and 
Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (MICAD) have made recent 
strides in publishing data on Emirati aid, other donors like the Emirati Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Finance lack a formalized system for publishing aid data. This is 
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perhaps due to the fact that neither of these ministries deals primarily with the UAE’s aid 
program; nevertheless, it would be very useful for analysis purposes to make these data 
available, either by coordinating with OCFA and MICAD or on their own. Moreover, the 
data are very imbalanced by year. Since Emirati efforts at increased transparency are 
relatively recent, with most taking place in the last five years, the data on Emirati aid 
before 2010 are limited to an average of less than ten commitments per year. There are 
over 400 observations, however, for 2011 alone (AidData 3.0, 2014). Although the 
abundance of this newly available data is a positive for researchers and scholars of Arab 
aid, it makes time series analysis difficult to conduct. Nevertheless, the available data are 
still useful for characterizing foreign aid, and make a few key trends in the aid process, 
like the preference for Muslim recipients, very clear.  
 The lack of available data on Emirati aid raise some concerns regarding the 
UAE’s level of transparency. In order to comply with international and Western aid 
norms, full transparency is an important requirement for prominent donors. When donors 
are not transparent, scholars, policymakers, researchers, and other interested parties might 
assume a donor is corrupt or has some reason to keep its aid activities away from the 
public eye. The lack of transparency also makes it difficult to distinguish between 
different sources of foreign aid from within the UAE, which also hinders research. In the 
case of the UAE, however, the apparent haphazardness of aid suggests that the Emirates 
may not have ulterior motives for keeping much of their aid activity private. Moreover, 
rather than keeping data on aid activities private for surreptitious reasons, it may be 
useful to consider that full transparency in terms of foreign aid might be a cultural and 
religious taboo. Indeed, it is considered un-Islamic and hubristic to publicize charitable 
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donations (Shushan and Marcoux, 2011). Since the Emirati government distributes 
foreign aid, it is not technically a private charitable donation, but it is still considered a 
donation to a less fortunate or well-off recipients (Abdulla, 2013). As a result, it could be 
culturally inappropriate to publicize all data on Emirati foreign aid, and may mean that 
the UAE and the broader Arab and Muslim worlds are not likely to become fully 
transparent in the future.  
 Despite the inadequacies of data on foreign aid, the efforts towards improved 
transparency bode well for future research efforts. My research raises several questions 
for further study. It would be interesting to conduct a sociological or psychological study 
to understand why foreign aid and its associated processes interest the particular members 
of the royal families who focus on Emirati development assistance. The dearth of 
scholarly literature on Arab foreign aid would benefit from a study of this sort, which 
could help explain more of the variation in the preferences and choices Arab donors 
make. Moreover, it would be useful to conduct similar research, applying theories like 
public opinion theory, selectorate theory, and other commonly studied justifications for 
Arab foreign policies to the other major donors of the Arabian Gulf. Although, as 
discussed in the literature review, there is some literature on Arab donors as a collective, 
there is a dearth of published case studies of individual Arab donors, which would help to 
facilitate comparisons of aid practices among Arab donors. Finally, given Emirati and 
Arab foreign aid’s transparency issues, research on the distinction between public and 
private sources of aid from the region would undoubtedly contribute to existing literature. 
Knowing these distinctions would allow scholars to study each form of Arab aid 
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differently, applying different theoretical justifications to each and seeing how they 
compare.  
 Ultimately, my research highlights the need for complete data to conduct a truly 
impartial and comprehensive analysis of foreign aid. My case study of the UAE helps 
highlight the paradox of Arab foreign aid: while Arab donors like the UAE are among the 
most generous in the world and merit much more study than has been devoted to them, 
they are also among the most opaque donors, which makes substantial and reliable 
studies of aid from the region very difficult to conduct. The UAE’s recent steps towards 
greater transparency, however, might translate to similar strides for neighboring donors, 
but such changes are not likely to occur for many years. Nevertheless, the conclusions I 
have drawn about Emirati foreign aid may help generate hypotheses for the behavior of 
other Arab donors. For instance, the UAE has often exhibited deference to Saudi Arabia 
in major instances of war and peace in the Arab World, highlighting the existence of an 
Arabian Gulf order where Saudi Arabia is the key actor and influencer (Ehteshami et al., 
1991). Although the UAE and Saudi Arabia have different foreign aid programs, the 
trends revealed for one may help explain some variation in the other. I hope that my 
research on the UAE may motivate further study of foreign aid from the Emirates and the 
Arab World: there is much still be discovered and discussed.  
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